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The purpose of this essay is to recover a correct conception of natural law and goodness in the ethics 
of St Thomas Aquinas. In the years since the Second Vatican Council, there have been many accounts 
and reconstructions of Thomistic ethics and natural law. While this profusion of Thomisms testifies 
to the importance of Aquinas for modern ethics, not only for Catholics but for those of other faiths or 
none, the present essay will focus on the merits of one reconstruction that has enjoyed unrivalled 
significance for legal philosophers: the elaborate and painstaking reconstruction of Thomistic natural 
law theory, in John Finnis’s book Natural Law and Natural Rights, and subsequently his book 
Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. Such is the predominance of this interpretation of 
Aquinas in legal philosophy that many legal scholars will be perplexed by the stated purpose of this 
essay: for the reader is instructed in that work that ‘natural law’ is a synonym for ‘ethics’, rather than 
— as the title of this essay implies — a part of ethics.1 At the same time, it might be suspected that 
this difference is merely a terminological one, upon which nothing of any great importance turns. 
 
As I hope to show, this suspicion is mistaken. The gap between Aquinas’s position and Finnis’s 
reconstruction is a radical one. Among the many issues that are affected, I will concentrate on only 
one: the character of goodness or the good. Finnis’s reconstruction leads him to suppose that the heart 
of Aquinas’s concern is with the identification, and subsequently pursuit of, basic human goods [bona 
humana]. These goods, including for example life and knowledge, are not moral goods. But the 
subject-matter of morality concerns the manner of one’s pursuit of these goods, as spelled out in 
criteria of ‘practical reasonableness’ (itself one of the human goods). On this view, ethics (i.e. natural 
law) is concerned with action, that is, with works to be done and actions to be performed — or 
avoided. The focus is upon the external form of the action, to the detriment of its interior quality 
except as a subjective intention. A correct interpretation of Thomistic ethics considers goodness and 
action in a different sense. It considers human ends to consist in virtuous goods, such as friendship, 
charity and the like, rather than in non-moral goods. Natural law [ius naturale] concerns only one 
aspect of this question, the greater part of which is taken up with moral theology (ethics). Perhaps 
because Finnis is addressing legal philosophers who are mostly positivists, his work does not give 
adequate treatment to moral theology.2 His account of Aquinas’s natural law theory is salutary in one 
important respect: namely, by making it clear that, as regards Christian ethics, there is a wide variety 
of different forms of living which count as a good, worthwhile life. But it is seriously mistaken in its 
sidelining of the virtues as mere ‘ways … of pursuing the basic values’.3 
 
Few modern-day interpreters of Aquinas have sought directly to oppose the fundamental errors of the 
Finnis reconstruction. In an early review essay, Ernest Fortin undertook perhaps the most famous 
such effort, but the effort misfired because of a misguided focus on supposed differences between a 
                                                
1 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [hereafter NLNR] (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2011), 18, 23, 251, 280, 374, 437 (‘… simply 
ethics and political philosophy adequately done’); Finnis, ‘Natural Law Theory: its Past and its Present’ (2012) 57 AJJ 81, 92. 
2 Only perhaps, for the theologian Germain Grisez, the originator of this interpretation of St Thomas, writes in the same vein (sometimes 
jointly with Finnis). For some references see below. 
3 Finnis, NLNR, 90-91. 
  
tradition of natural right and one of natural law.4 Both Russell Hittinger and Jean Porter have offered 
salient critiques, but neither expose the fundamental error underlying Finnis’s approach (the 
prioritisation of non-moral goodness over virtuous goodness.) 5  Moreover, virtually all modern 
Thomists agree in regarding natural law and the ethics of virtue to be alternative terms for the same 
thing.6 The effort to correct these errors seems worth undertaking, due to the influence Finnis’s 
writings have had in legal philosophy and beyond. 
 
I will therefore begin by discussing the reconstruction of Aquinas’s position by Finnis and his 
collaborators (Part I). After exposing some of the problems with this interpretation (Part II), I will 
give an account of Aquinas’s true position (Parts III-V). As stated above, I will confine my arguments 
to issues concerning the good or goodness, and natural law. 
 
 
I.  Natural Law Reconstructed 
 
The influential modern-day reconstruction of Thomistic natural law (so-called ‘new natural law 
theory’)7 began with a commentary upon Quaestio 94.2 of the Summa Theologiae’s prima secundae 
pars.8  Here, Aquinas gives his response to the question ‘whether the natural law contains many 
precepts, or only one.’ In the main reply, he affirms that the natural law contains a variety of precepts, 
all of which are based on a primary indemonstrable precept, that ‘the good is to be done and pursued, 
and the bad is to be avoided’. The variety of the other precepts has an order to it which corresponds 
to the order to be found in natural human inclinations: the most basic inclinations pertain to one’s 
survival, so it belongs to natural law that one ought to pursue one’s own life, and avoid threats to life; 
one’s inclinations to beget and educate offspring are similarly reflected in natural law precepts; and 
the more sophisticated inclinations that are distinctly human, such as the desire to know the truth and 
to live peacefully in society, are likewise contained in precepts of natural law.9 
 
Among the points that the new natural lawyers wish to stress, are the following: 1) Aquinas preserves 
the practical orientation of moral thinking by founding all natural law precepts upon a primary 
indemonstrable practical precept: ‘ought’ is not being derived from ‘is’, morality is not being derived 
from ‘nature’ or any injunction to ‘follow nature’; (2) the references to good [bonum] and bad 
[malum] in the primary precept do not denote moral ideas; even the very wicked reason on the basis 
of these precepts for ‘end’ has the intelligible significance of ‘good’, and every person who acts, acts 
for the sake of some end; (3) Aquinas’s response sets out the first principle of practical reason (i.e. 
                                                
4 See E Fortin, ‘The New Rights Theory and the Natural Law’ (1982) 44 Review of Politics 590. For Finnis’s belated response, see 
‘Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law’ (2015) 60 AJJ 199. 
5 See e.g. R Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (University of Notre Dame Press 1989) 50-52; Hittinger, ‘Natural 
Law as “Law”’ 39 (1994) AJJ 1; J Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (Westminster/John Knox Press 1990) ch 2; Porter, Nature as Reason 
(Eerdmans 2005); Porter, Ministers of the Law (Eerdmans 2010), 66-67 & 182-4; T Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition 
(Routledge 2003), 136-148. 
6 The exceptions are V Bourke, ‘Is Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?’ 58 (1974) The Monist, 52; S Pinkaers, The Sources of Christian 
Ethics (T&T Clark 1995) 134-67; 327-53; T Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor (Fordham University Press 2001), 9 & ch 2; and (to a point) T 
Irwin, The Development of Ethics (Oxford University Press 2007), I §§ 301-305 & 309. 
7 The phrase, due to Hittinger, is not one that its adherents readily accept, for they wish to stress faithfulness and continuity with 
Aquinas. I use it, with due hesitation, for the sake of convenience. 
8 G Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary…’ (1965) 10 Natural Law Forum 168. 
9 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST] I-II.94.2c. 
  
natural law), but there are many others, of the form ‘X is a good, to be pursued…’, or ‘Y is contrary 
to good, and so to be avoided…’; (4) Aquinas does not give an exhaustive list of such goods, although 
some are mentioned later in the reply; (5) the reply leaves open to question the identity of the moral 
principles which ought to govern the way in which individuals should devote themselves to the 
fundamental human goods.10 
 
From this it should be noted that the new natural lawyers have succeeded in capturing the eudaimonist 
orientation of Aquinas’s ethics, which is fundamentally concerned with our end and good. In this, 
they successfully steered natural law theory away from the narrow legalism that had come to dominate 
in the early twentieth century (points (1)-(3)). The main effort of reconstruction was with points (4) 
and (5), the moral theory or ‘action theory’: these concerned matters, to quote Finnis’s words, of 
which Aquinas gives a ‘highly elliptical, scattered’ and even ‘seriously underdeveloped’ account.11 
 
This effort of reconstruction depended upon premises that seem reasonable enough. In order to grasp 
even the most basic moral precepts, such as that one must not harm one’s neighbour, it is first 
necessary to understand what is good for one’s neighbour; and both these goods and the practical 
principles which identify them, cannot then themselves be moral in character, for they are the 
necessary prelude to morality. Aquinas calls them quasi fines praeceptorum12 [more akin to the ends 
of the precepts] and seminalia virtutum13 [roots of the virtues]. The initial work of practical reason is 
thus with the identification of basic human goods, those genuine and self-evident forms of human 
flourishing, of which Aquinas gives only a few examples (preservation of one’s existence, procreative 
union, knowledge, sociability), and of which perhaps some exhaustive account can be given.14 Since 
these goods are incommensurable (in being basic), there is no overall vantage point from which one 
sort of life is intrinsically better or more morally excellent than another. There are therefore many 
legitimate and reasonable ways in which a person may devote themselves to the basic human goods. 
Only circumstances render a given choice between basic goods reasonable or unreasonable (I should 
not read books as the house burns down around me). Having once elaborated the human goods that 
it is valuable to pursue, the central and foundational moral questions then become: (i) given the 
infinite variety of ways in which it is possible to devote oneself and one’s life to combinations of 
these goods, and the very finite time, capacities and opportunities at one’s disposal, which goods or 
which combination of goods ought I to devote myself; and (ii) in what ways must I act so as to ensure 
that I do not directly harm, diminish, or otherwise qualify such goods, or prevent or restrict others’ 
participation in them? 
 
It is with the second question, in particular, that new natural lawyers have been concerned. The end 
or goal for the human being is ‘all-round flourishing’ or ‘integral human fulfilment’, tantamount to 
                                                
10 See e.g. Grisez, n 4; Finnis, NLNR chs II-V; Grisez, Finnis & J Boyle ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends’ (1987) 
32 AJJ 99; Finnis, Grisez & Boyle, ‘‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A Reply to Critics of our Action Theory’ (2001) 65 The Thomist 1; Finnis, 
The Collected Essays of John Finnis (5 vols, Oxford University Press 2011), [hereafter CJEF], essays I.9-10; Finnis, Fundamentals of 
Ethics (Georgetown University Press 1983), III.4. 
11 NLNR, 46. 
12 ST I-II.100.11c. 
13 Ibid, I-II.63.1c. 
14 For Finnis’s list of seven basic goods, see NLNR III-IV. 
  
Aquinas’s notion of beatitudo imperfecta. 15  Its achievement is obtained by accordance with the 
requirements of practical reasonableness, but above all with the ‘master’ principle of morality, that 
one should not directly attack any basic good. To use the classic example from Catholic moral 
teaching, a doctor can morally surgically intervene to save the life of a pregnant woman, even if the 
fully certain and foreseen consequence of the intervention is the termination of the life of the unborn 
child, i.e. as long as it is not part of the doctor’s intention to abort the unborn, which is merely accepted 
as a foreseeable side-effect. This obviously makes moral demands on two aspects of action: (1) the 
external form of the act (that it is reasonable, proportionate, etc); and (2) that the interior act of 
intention is morally licit. This must of course involve more than simply compliance with the above 
precept, for instance it must involve some notion of distributive fairness and commutative justice, 
among other things. But there is no present need to spell out these further requirements, for my 
concern is with the basic form of the theory, and the role of good or goodness within it. 
 
 
II.  Criticism of this Reconstruction 
 
It is taken for granted by new natural lawyers that Aquinas’s purpose in Quaestio 94.2 is to found all 
of the precepts of natural law upon a first indemonstrable principle. Proceeding from this principle 
(that the good is to be done…) it is possible to attain all of the subsequent precepts of natural law, 
including (eventually) the moral precepts discussed earlier. But there are two puzzling features of 
Aquinas’s thought, if we accept this explanation. The first is that Aquinas does not use the 
opportunity, either then or subsequently, to spell out these precepts: they remain ‘scattered’, 
‘elliptical’ and ‘underdeveloped’. The second is that this Quaestio sits in the midst of the Summa’s 
‘treatise’ on Law; but by this point Aquinas has already given a detailed treatment of ethics in the 
‘treatise’ on Beatitude (i.e. human ends), (QQ.1-5), in that on Human Acts (QQ.7-21), on Passions 
(QQ.22-48) and on Virtues and Vices (QQ.49-89). If we include the treatise on Grace (QQ.109-114) 
in an account of Aquinas’s moral theology (as we ought to do), it is impossible not to notice that the 
questions on law (QQ.90-108), in which natural law itself is but one subject, are situated in a far more 
wide-ranging ethical treatise: one which is taken up immediately again in the Secunda-secundae’s 
detailed discussion of particular virtues (numbering 189 questions). Why should the foundational 
precepts of Aquinas’s ethics (moral theology) be hidden away in his discussion of law? 
 
These mysteries disappear if we accept a different interpretation of Aquinas’s purpose: he simply was 
not looking for a foundation to ethics in Quaestio 94.2. Its question (‘whether there are many natural 
law precepts, or only one’) is in fact Aquinas’s reworking of a standard topic of scholastic philosophy, 
whether there are many laws of nature or only one: a question which, despite its contradictory 
appearance, arose out of the scholastic method of seeking illumination in the writings of opponents 
by extracting from them what is true, on the basis of which a reply is constructed and mistaken views 
explained and corrected. In this case, the scholastic writers were faced with numerous divergent 
conceptions of the natural law. From the stoics they drew the idea of natural law as right reason in 
                                                
15 Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 1998), 106-07; ‘Direct and Indirect’ (above n 10); 
NLNR 100-33, 451, 454-56. Aquinas 103-31 discusses integral human fulfilment at length; but note that as a practical philosopher, 
Finnis would regard that notion as ultimately uninformative except insofar as the master moral principle and its derivatives (e.g. no 
arbitrary priority amongst persons) specify how a person is to attain it. 
  
accord with nature; from the Roman jurists (in Ulpian’s famous definition), that which nature teaches 
to all animals; from Scripture and patristic sources, a specifically Christian idea; and — in Aquinas’s 
case — Aristotle’s ethical philosophy. Aquinas’s reply harmonises all of these conceptions by 
explaining that they all depend upon the ideas of ‘good’ and ‘end’.16 
 
Proceeding from this interpretation, it becomes clear that Quaestio 94.2 is not, as modern-day 
Thomist natural lawyers believe, the cornerstone of Aquinas’s entire treatment of ethics. If we want 
to identify anything as the foundation of Aquinas’s ethics, the place to look is in the prologue to his 
discussion of ultimate end. This comes immediately after the short prologue to the Prima-secundae 
itself, which identifies the subject-matter of the ensuing discussion as human action, ‘insofar as the 
human being is the source of his own actions [homine … est suorum operum principium], in 
possessing free will and control over his actions.’ Aquinas says that the inquiry will be: what is our 
ultimate end, and by what means do we advance toward the end, or otherwise deviate away from it? 
At no point in the long discussion of ethics in the Summa Theologiae (or elsewhere to my knowledge) 
does Aquinas ever raise the question of a ‘master moral principle’ or of an ultimate foundation of 
ethics. The reason is simple: he endorses a eudaimonist ethics, in which the important questions 
concern the identification of the final end; and it is from an understanding of the end that we, 
derivatively, come to have a knowledge of the steps we have to take in order to attain it. The term 
Aquinas uses for this ultimate end is ‘beatitude’ [beatitudo]; and the various subordinate goods which 
we have to realise as steps on the way to it, Aquinas usually describes as ‘imperfect beatitude’ 
[beatitudo imperfecta], or merely ‘happiness’ [felicitas]. The nature of these subordinate goods is 
determined by the nature of the final end: ‘for the end is the rule of whatever is ordered to the end.’17 
 
Aquinas’s reference to the means of advancement to the end, and the reference to subordinate 
(human) goods, is a reference to the virtues: in answer to the question whether imperfect happiness 
in this life can be lost, he replies that it can, either because extraneous circumstances impede one’s 
efforts, or because ‘a person degenerates into vice from virtue, in the actions of which this happiness 
principally consists.’18 By contrast, the basic human goods which are at the heart of the modern-day 
reconstruction of Aquinas’s position are not virtuous goods [bonum honestum] but natural goods 
[bonum naturale], such as health and knowledge.19 Moreover, the virtues are relegated to the status 
of ‘ways … of pursuing’ the basic natural goods.20 Yet even here, the virtues are subordinated to 
moral principles, for virtues ‘are a response to reasons, and reasons are propositional’;21 and ‘the 
relevant propositions are the first principles of practical reason(ing)’.22  
 
                                                
16 I owe the insight concerning the standard topic on laws of nature to Jean Porter, ‘Does the Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid 
Morality?’ in LS Cunningham, Intractable Disputes About the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and his Critics (University of Notre 
Dame Press 2009), 53, 62-67. See her text for examples of the discussion of this standard topic. 
17 ST I-II.1, prologue. 
18 Ibid, I-II.5.4c. 
19 See e.g. Suarez, De Legibus II.7.5 & 15.2; Disputationes Metaphysicae X.2.11-13; Aquinas, ST I-II.98.4 ad 3. 
20 Finnis, NLNR, 90-91: the sidelining of the virtues is clear from the fact that this is the only sentence in the entire book to mention 
the virtues. Perhaps as a consequence of criticism, Finnis’s later book Aquinas gives more explicit treatment to the virtues, but they 
remain subordinate (see main text above). 
21 See Finnis, Aquinas, 124; also 107: virtue in action ‘means practical reason in action’. Cf. ST I-II.58.2c & ad 3 for a correction of 
this picture. 
22 Finnis, NLNR, 422 (2011 postscript). 
  
Again, it is never explained why such a careful thinker as Aquinas should have failed so entirely to 
identify the relevant principles, nor why his discussion proceeds through a discussion of mere 
‘modes’ of participation in fundamental goods which he nowhere exhaustively describes. The reason 
is that, for Aquinas, the virtuous goods of friendship, charity, justice and compassion are the 
fundamental goods in which happiness consists: ‘the virtuous good is the fundamental human good 
[honestum sit principale hominis bonum] … whereas those goods which pertain to the body or 
external goods which benefit the body, are secondary goods.’23 On the subject of natural goods, 
Aquinas’s standpoint is the same as that of Aristotle: ‘they do not belong to the very essence of 
happiness, but are necessary instruments in the service of happiness, which consists in the work of 
virtue.’24 Also of relevance is Aquinas’s firm reminder that beatitude does not consist in any created 
good [bonum creatum], i.e. those goods which bring to rest man’s natural desires.25 In this he follows 
St Augustine’s teaching that the love of created goods as one’s ultimate end is a mortal sin.26 
 
Finnis and other new natural lawyers invert this order. For in regarding virtues not as basic values but 
as ways of pursuing and obtaining basic values (such as knowledge or life), they consider the human 
good to consist in basic goods that remain incommensurable, in that any hierarchy amongst them 
could only ever be temporary and for the sake of some specific purpose or ordering. This contradicts 
Aquinas’s own view of the matter, for he regards acquired virtues as the greatest of human goods, 
though not absolutely speaking: the absolutely greatest good is infused virtue, because it guides us 
toward our supreme supernatural good.27 There exists, then, a clear hierarchy in which virtuous goods 
occupy a higher place than natural goods; indeed the incommensurability of natural goods arises 
because there are numerous ways of living and pursuing a virtuous life. But in each instance, the basic 
natural goods assist us in pursuing virtue, not virtue assisting us to obtain natural goods.28 
 
The extent to which the new natural law reconstruction severely limits the scope of Aquinas’s ethics 
should begin to become clear. As a first step, it limits the importance of the virtues to aspects of 
reasonableness in pursuing basic natural goods. In practice, this means that one can inquire into the 
external form of an act (e.g. whether it is proportionate to the end it aims to achieve), or into the 
interior quality of the act, in terms of the reasonableness of its intention. As a second step, the 
reconstruction restricts Aquinas’s ethics to his theory of natural law. In consequence, Aquinas’s ethics 
appears to possess at once a legalistic character (in that it concerns a morality of principles to 
orchestrate the ways in which goods can be legitimately pursued) and a highly analogical conception 
of natural law (in that natural human goods and modes of pursuit are identified by demands of 
practical reasonableness that are only roughly akin to laws in the strict sense).29 
 
                                                
23 ST III.15.6 ad 2. 
24 Ibid, I-II.4.7c: Aquinas talks of bodily or external good [bonis corpis; bona exteriora], but note the reference to that which is needed 
for contemplative and active virtue, hence e.g. natural goods like bodily health, knowledge etc. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
I.5.1095b-1096a; I.8.1099a; Aquinas, ST I-II.3.5c. 
25 ST I-II.2.8c & ad 3. 
26 Augustine, De Civitate Dei XIV.28; Aquinas, ST I-II.108.4c; De Caritate VI. 
27 See respectively Finnis, NLNR 91-95; Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus 9 ad 6 & 7. 
28 See De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae 13.3: we do not love things such as knowledge, virtue and external goods in themselves, but 
only as an aid to oneself in virtue of the service they render one. (Thus everything is referable to love of God that is necessary for 
salvation — or — to love of oneself absolutely, leading away from God). 
29 See e.g. NLNR 280-81. 
  
Natural law cannot play this expanded role in Aquinas’s ethics, however. This much is apparent from 
the fact that our ultimate end is not natural but supernatural: the vision of God in the afterlife.30 The 
whole of Aquinas’s ethics (moral theology) is centred upon a return to God [reditus],31 a purpose 
which cannot be gathered from natural instincts alone but requires revelation.32 In the following two 
sections, I examine both aspects of Aquinas’s ethics: the meaning of its articulation in terms of 
virtues, and the place of natural law within it. As I shall argue in part IV below, natural law fulfils 
three functions in Aquinas’s ethics: (1) it explains how natural human inclinations are toward the 
moral virtues, even for people who lived without divine revelation; (2) it explains why universal 
moral truths are compatible with many different ways of living seen across the world; and (3) it 
explains the basis upon which unjust state law must be obeyed. These are important matters, but as I 
will explain later, they are far from being the whole matter of ethics for Aquinas. 
 
First however, I will clarify the importance of the virtues in Aquinas’s thinking. 
 
 
III. Virtuous Goodness in Aquinas’s Ethics 
 
A reader of Natural Law and Natural Rights directly encounters virtue only once in the book, for the 
purpose of being told that virtue is an entirely subordinate concern of natural law: the book itself 
seems to constitute evidence that Thomistic ‘ethics’ (i.e. natural law) can be presented entirely in 
other terms in which there is no mention of the virtues. In sharp contrast Finnis’s later book Aquinas 
is filled with references to the virtues. A reader of both works may find this change puzzling. But 
there is no real difference in the substance of Finnis’s argument, because he continues to treat the 
virtues as a subordinate issue, for inasmuch as they are rational aspects of moral deliberation, it is 
thought that they must be a response to reasons that are propositional (see Part II above). In fact, in a 
recent essay Finnis argues that the virtues are hiding in plain sight in the earlier book: for it treats 
extensively of two virtues in particular, justice and practical reasonableness. The latter is Finnis’s 
own term for Aquinas’s prudentia, the guiding virtue of practical reason that is simultaneously 
intellectual and moral.33 
 
The shift is not a mere terminological one, however. For Aquinas is as clear as he can be that the 
work of practical reason (if we substitute this phrase for prudence) cannot be accomplished without 
the full range of moral virtues: prudence cannot assist us in judging well unless it is supported by 
moral virtue.34 For Aquinas, rightful choosing requires both an inclination to a due end, and the 
correct choice of the things conducive to the end. These choices are made by exercising the 
intellectual virtue of prudence [prudentia], i.e. ‘practical reasonableness’. In Aquinas’s classic phrase 
                                                
30 ST I-II.3.8c. 
31 See e.g. ST II-II.20.1 ad 3; Sent I.14.2.2; Sent II.18.2.2.4; Sent IV.49.1.3.1; De perfectione spiritualis vitae IV; it is also implicit at 
ST I-II.1.5. See also Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (WJKP 1990) 53. 
32 ST I.2.1 (knowledge of the existence of God is not self-evident); SCG III.38.1.2161 (natural knowledge is insufficient); on the 
importance of inclinations for natural law, see ST I-II.94.2c. 
33 See Finnis, ‘Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law’ 60 (2015) American Journal of Jurisprudence. 199; Aquinas, ST I-II.58.3 ad 
1. 
34 ST I-II.58.5; I-II.60.1c. See also the excellent account of reason’s role in moral judgment in M Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love 
(CUA Press 2005) especially 23-24. 
  
this is ‘right reason concerning things to be done’.35 But he clarifies immediately that ‘one cannot 
have prudence unless one has the moral virtues, for … reason originally proceeds from a grasp of the 
end of the thing to be done, to which we are rightly orientated by the moral virtues.’36 Furthermore, 
Aquinas holds it to be possible to possess the virtue of justice without that of prudence (although it 
will not be a perfect virtue), and acknowledges that virtues such as temperance and fortitude can exist 
‘in some way’ [aliqualiter esse] without prudence: the difference is between doing a good work, and 
doing a good work for the right reasons.37 
 
The importance of the virtues in Aquinas’s thought is made clear in his Disputed Questions on the 
Virtues, where in his response to Quaestio 2 he draws attention to the fact that virtue, in disposing us 
to acts that perfect us, obviates the need to reason our way to goodness from the beginning on each 
occasion.38 If reason is the root of all the virtues39 and is active in fulfilling all of virtue,40 nevertheless 
only God can completely align our appetites with reason, by infusing certain virtues into us and by 
shaping our appetites and inclinations toward the good.41 
 
Aquinas also holds that virtues demand a rule or measure, and the new natural lawyers rightly notice 
that he devotes some effort to state the precepts that correspond to each virtue: for example, in the 
case of justice, ‘giving to others what is due to them’, or in the case of charity, ‘loving God above 
all’ and ‘loving one’s neighbour as oneself’. But they are mistaken to think that the precepts suffice 
to determine virtuous courses of action. On the contrary, Aquinas warns that the precepts are 
meaningless unless one possesses the corresponding virtue, since moral virtues are rightful 
dispositions of will, whose function is to guide practical reason to the correct objects. For a person 
who has the corresponding virtue, its precept serves to specify its point or end; yet a theoretical 
knowledge of the end will not specify (without the corresponding disposition) the thing to be done in 
a given situation, to progress to the end. This is clearly affirmed in Aquinas’s treatment of charity, 
where it is said that charity does not govern reason as a rule or precept, but by a kind of affinity.42 
 
An example will explain the distinction. In the response to the question, whether beneficence is an 
act of charity, Aquinas observes that the giving of a gift includes two aspects, the external object that 
is given, and the inward state of heart associated with delight in riches. The virtue of liberality works 
upon the inner passion so as to moderate inordinate desire and love of one’s own, and to make a 
person more willing to part with their wealth. Thus, if a person donates a great gift, yet with an 
excessive desire to retain it for themselves [concupiscentia retinendi], this act of giving is not an 
instance of liberality. But in regard to the outer gift itself, an act of beneficence belongs to friendship 
or charity, and therefore it does not diminish a person’s friendship if they give to a friend, from love, 
something which they strongly desire to retain for themselves. Rather this demonstrates the perfection 
of their friendship.43 Neither the interior work, in which one learns to moderate the desire or love of 
one’s own, nor the external act of beneficence, properly involve following a precept. Aquinas is very 
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specific, that an act of beneficence arises ‘from love’, which is a kind of charity. This does not mean 
that virtues are, to borrow Finnis’s phrase, ‘sub-rational’: friendship with others, like other virtuous 
goods, consists in a rational disposition [habitus] rather than only an emotion [passio]. So, a person 
who has the proper rational inclinations will spontaneously perform noble acts, even if they do not 
consciously have the relevant precepts. The precepts merely assist the virtues, by specifying the end 
(as in love of God and neighbour). 
 
It seems that one reason for the modern-day misconception of Aquinas’s teachings on the virtues lies 
in a narrower idea of reason than that assumed by the scholastics. I refer again to the idea that practical 
rationality consists in a response to reasons, which are propositional. This idea is not the same as the 
scholastic idea. As we have seen, Aquinas is concerned with actions that arise from virtuous 
dispositions, which are not mere passions. The new natural lawyers are right to say that a person’s 
interior deliberations are in the form of propositions (it should also be added: as well as questions, 
doubts and guesses). But it would be wrong to think that virtue is equivalent to any set of propositions. 
A useful analogy is with a statement of the common law: a rule of the common law is never captured 
in its entirety by the propositions which try to express it. At most, very classic formulations express 
something that is timeless in the rule, but there is always an additional need to interpret the rule for 
the circumstances. This means that a law is always formally distinct from the propositions that 
interpret it. Similarly, a virtue is not merely another (less useful) way to talk about moral reasons for 
action. For it is — like a law — a source of reasons. Accordingly, much of the treatises on particular 
virtues in the Secunda-secundae are taken up with questions in which Aquinas is obliged to explain 
and reconcile apparent contradictions between the demands of the different virtues, as with the 
relationship between liberality and beneficence, above. For this reason, he affirms that, ‘since 
charitable love ought to be extended to all, beneficence should also be extended to all, but according 
to place and time; for all acts of virtue are shaped according to their due circumstances.’44 
 
Given the importance of the virtues and virtuous goodness for Aquinas’s moral theology, it is 
necessary to understand the importance and purposes of natural law in his thought. These purposes 
are limited, but significant as I shall now argue. 
 
 
IV.  The Limited Scope of Natural Law 
 
In the second step of Finnis’s approach to Aquinas, he associates natural law [ius naturale; lex 
naturalis] with the whole field of ethics or moral theology. In fact, natural law doctrines occupy only 
a limited space within Aquinas’s ethics. These purposes can be divided into three, as follows. 
 
(a) Inclination and revelation 
In the first place, the purpose served by natural law in Aquinas’s ethics is to explain why individuals 
or entire peoples who never possessed the revealed truths of Scripture, nonetheless possessed a 
knowledge of virtue. The pagan philosophers, above all Aristotle and Plato, wrote and taught 
extensively on ethics, in ways which obviously anticipate Aquinas’s own discussions, without the 
benefit of revelation. As a eudaimonist, Aquinas believes that there are not several ultimate ends but 
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only one. All other goods except the one ultimate end are subordinate to that end, and remain good 
only insofar as they do not point away from the end.45 It was therefore necessary to explain how pagan 
philosophers like Aristotle could possess moral truths even though they possessed an incorrect idea 
of the ultimate end.46 The explanation required two things: it needed to call attention to the goodness 
per se of the things which derive their goodness from the final end, i.e. that they are genuine goods 
even when taken on their own terms — Aquinas does this in his treatise on ultimate end, and to a 
lesser extent in the treatise on law;47 and it needed to show how pagans could have knowledge of 
these truths whilst not possessing revealed truth. Aquinas says that there is an exterior (as well as an 
internal) principle by which God moves human beings to the good, consisting partly in direction 
through law [instruit per legem] and partly in the assistance of Grace.48 He does this by endowing 
human beings (and other creatures) with characteristic inclinations by which they naturally incline to 
their good, and — in the case of human beings — by ‘placing [a law, i.e. the natural law] into human 
minds so that it can be naturally apprehended’.49 Irrational creatures are subject to eternal law entirely 
through the operation of their natural instincts, whereas human beings participate in eternal law in a 
free and self-directed way.  
 
This enables Aquinas to say that the pagan philosophers’ conception of our end is not incorrect 
because it is not our good, but because it is not a complete conception of our good. Their idea of the 
supreme good represents what can be obtained by the natural power of reason; whereas the true 
supreme good, the beatific vision in the afterlife, needs the assistance of revelation and grace.50 Even 
natural reason, operating without revelation (but with the assistance of God’s law and Grace), can 
perceive the distinction between what is naturally desired as good for oneself (natural or true good), 
and what is desired with a ‘self-preferring’ love as a chosen [per electio] good (i.e. apparent or false 
good).51 This lies at the core of the first precept of natural law, that the good is to be done and pursued, 
and the bad avoided.  
 
According to the new natural law reconstruction of Aquinas’s ethics, this precept simply affirms an 
equivalence between the concept of ‘good’ and ‘to be done’, for even the very wicked reason from it 
(with a misguided sense of good). 52  Indeed, such a view is not confined to new natural law 
philosophers: for example, Sherwin regards the directivity of I-II.94.2 as an orientation toward a 
‘general notion’ of good.53 
 
Some passages of Aquinas seem to lend support to this interpretation: at several points he states that 
derivative principles of natural law (those known only by the wise) can be wiped out from the hearts 
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of sinners, but not the primary (per se nota) precepts.54 In a passage from the De Veritate, he also 
claims that error in practical reason does not arise from first principles per se, but from the misuse of 
principles. 55  The context however makes it clear that Aquinas is referring specifically to the 
impossibility of wiping out the truth about moral goodness from the human heart. This is evident first 
of all from the topic under discussion, synderesis, i.e. the disposition [habitus] by which a person 
intuitively apprehends the first principles of practical reason. Aquinas affirms the position that sinful 
desires can overwhelm synderesis, but synderesis itself cannot fall into error. For there is nothing that 
is so execrable that no good is admixed with it.56 This makes it clear that Aquinas is discussing the 
permanence of moral goodness in the human heart. Furthermore, it is clear why this must be 
Aquinas’s meaning: for he thinks that we are assisted in our progress toward the supreme good by 
means of God’s Grace and the instruction of His Law. These are by no means eradicable, even by the 
very sinful.  
 
But the first precept of natural law (that the good is to be done...) cannot be supposed to refer to the 
pursuit of false goods: a point Aquinas makes specifically in his treatment of virtuous goodness, in 
which he states that the good of virtue (prudence) is not the goodness that is convertible with being, 
but moral goodness.57 It is clear also when he observes that intelligence stands toward knowing the 
truth (not falsehoods) in the same way that the will stands toward loving the good.58 One could point 
also to Aquinas’s reference to the Gloss on the passage in Romans 2:14 (‘When the Gentiles, who 
have not the law, do naturally the things contained in the law, they are a law to themselves’): 
 
Though [the Gentiles] do not have the written law, they still have the natural law, in the light of 
which everyone understands and is directly conscious of [sibi conscius est] what is good and what 
is evil.59 
 
It can be concluded from this that Aquinas intended the primary precept of natural law as a reference 
to the virtuous good, and not a mere formal (empty) idea of ‘good’ to cover alike the possibilities of 
real and false good.60 
 
(b) Universal truths and modes of life 
The second purpose fulfilled by natural law in Aquinas’s ethics is to explain the relationship between 
universal moral truth and the many different ways of living in a community seen across the world. 
The teachings of Christ and the Apostles in the New Testament concern the duties to love God and 
to love one’s neighbours, but they do not prescribe any single form of political society as morally the 
most excellent. Indeed the Gospels are careful to separate the duties owed to God from those owed 
to Caesar. Because the perfection of earthly communities is not our last end, moral theology does not 
specify particular political forms as objects of work to be achieved in this life. 
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Natural law — i.e. that part of Aquinas’s ethics which deals with our natural ends — pertains to 
matters of virtuous actions ordered to the common good of the community.61 First among all the 
matters essential to the common good is peace [pax], consisting of sociable or benevolent dispositions 
to one’s fellow citizens [harmonia, concordia], 62  tranquility of internal order within the state 
[temporalis tranquillitas civitatis], as well as justice [iustum] and prosperity [affluentia]. 63  The 
attainment of these ends also demands the good of a stable legal order,64 proportionate government 
and impartiality in settling disputes,65 enforcement of bargains and remuneration for work, as well as 
the restraint of negligent acts [reparatio] 66  and punishment of crimes [retributio]. 67  These are 
necessary goods for all societies. Without them, there is anarchy rather than society.  
 
One aspect of these goods (or equivalently, ends) looks towards the responsibilities of state 
government in securing them for its citizens. I will deal with this in subsection (c) on unjust law, 
below. But it would be a mistake to regard them only as duties of the state, for they are also 
responsibilities for every citizen. All except the most wicked can agree on the need to maintain 
peaceful and just relations with one’s fellow citizens (e.g. to refrain from inflammatory behaviour, to 
perform one’s contractual duties, render what is owed etc). Even people with highly divergent views 
of our ultimate end can agree on them, just because they are not the ultimate end but subordinate ends 
that must be obtained no matter what one’s individual conception of the ultimate end. Of course for 
the Christian, it is necessary not only to deal justly with one’s neighbours but also to love them: to 
exhibit not only the virtue of iustitia, but also of caritas. But natural law — the part of ethics divested 
of moral theology — also indicates why it is important to acquire iustitia. Most societies (unless they 
are deficient or very wicked) place citizens under positive legal duties of justice, like the observance 
of contracts, payment of taxes, compensation for harms etc. It is possible for the citizen to perform 
these duties very unwillingly, under protest or through enforcement by the courts. Such a person will 
not have happiness, because they act against their will, and in spite of their inmost wishes. It was 
clear even to pagan philosophers therefore that a prerequisite for a happy life was the acquisition of 
virtuous habits. 
 
Modern legal philosophers are aware that effective legal order needs the voluntary compliance of a 
majority of citizens, who willingly carry out their legal duties of justice. Likewise, Aquinas noted the 
natural propensity of human beings to a life of peace in society.68 But although all societies are 
founded upon natural law precepts of peace and justice, there will be a wide variety in the specific 
laws and arrangements by which each society pursues these ends. He acknowledges this for example 
in the De Regno, ‘[i]t is clear that a people can only be considered as one community [multitudine] if 
they are under the same laws and the same government…’69 Some requirements of justice, such as 
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the restraint of murder and fraud, or acts of restitution or compensation, are directly spelled out in the 
positive state law of all communities, and this common content was hence often referred to in classic 
writings as the law of peoples [ius gentium] or the European common (civil) law [ius commune]. But 
many other matters concerning, e.g. the specification of punishments, the method of determining title 
to property rights, distribution of risk in contract, the form of pleading in litigation, the constitutional 
powers of the prime minister or the president, and so forth, are all more or less matters for reasonable 
determination [determinatio] rather than direct derivation from moral precepts.70 In the most extreme 
cases, on morally indifferent matters, positive state laws derive all of their authority from their 
enactment (e.g. whether to drive on the right or the left).71 
 
This leads naturally on to the third purpose that is served by natural law in Aquinas’s ethics, its 
explanation of when one should obey even an unjust enactment of the positive state law. 
 
(c) Unjust enactments 
Natural law explains the basis for obeying positive state law: since positive law is enacted for the 
common good of the community [bonum civile], it would be unjust to prioritise one’s private interests 
over one’s legal duties of justice. The basis of positive state law consists in the necessity to safeguard 
the common good. Private individuals do not possess the detachment or the coercive authority that is 
necessary to protect or oversee the common good. Only a ruling authority [princeps] governing 
through law can hope to secure internal order [ordo per legem] and the organised defence of the 
community against external enemies. 72  All political forms of government are rooted in these 
necessities, which explain the citizen’s obligation to obey the state laws. 
 
But natural law also gives reasons for disobedience to positive law, which are not political reasons. 
Political disagreement is not a sufficient basis for disobeying the positive law of the state. A person 
may conscientiously disobey the law only in the gravest circumstances: Aquinas remarks that it may 
often be necessary to give up one’s just rights by offering obedience to an unjust law, in order to 
avoid disrupting civil order [turbatio] or occasioning public outcry [scandalum].73 This is a reference 
to unjust provisions that might exist in a legal system which commands willing obedience due to 
being orientated to the common good. The loss to one’s rights does not permit illegal resistance which 
endangers the broader common goods of peace, harmony, concord and the like. 
 
But there are other kinds of unjust law which are not conscientiously binding. An example would be 
a law which commands the performance of an immoral act: such as murder, or taking more than one’s 
proper share. In this case, one denies another’s right as a means of unjustly extending one’s own right. 
Acts of this kind damage an important component of the common good: justice (the virtue which 
ensures that each person will obtain what is theirs by right).  
 
This encompasses another possibility, i.e. laws that are unjustly burdensome to all subjects, or laws 
that are orientated away from the common good of the community and instead towards the lawgiver. 
                                                
70 See esp. ST I-II.104.1c: they get their force not from reason alone but (also) from their enactment [non habeant vim obligandi ex sola 
ratio sed ex institutione]. 
71 Ibid, I-II.95.2c. 
72 Ibid, I-II.104.1 ad 1 (detachment); I-II.90.3 ad 2 (authority); De Virtutibus Cardinalibus 4.4. 
73 Ibid, I-II.96.4c & ad 3; I-II.97.1 ad 2; II-II.117.6c. 
  
Laws of these kinds are not conscientiously binding upon the subject, because their enactment 
exceeds the authority of the lawgiver [ultra vires], which is restricted to upholding the common 
good.74 They are not ‘licitly laws’ but more like violent interventions.75 They retain a resemblance to 
law in the proper sense only because they carry out a similar social function, but in a perverted way: 
they direct citizens to goodness, though not simply but relative to that particular government.76 
 
All of these matters are available to careful ethical reflection, without the need of revealed truths (e.g. 
the outlines can be found in Books V and IX of Aristotle’s Ethics). The treatment given to these issues 
by Aquinas, particularly in the ‘treatise’ on Law, makes clear that human beings have every reason 
to accept and practise the virtues, even if they reject the truth of revelation. In the light of the range 
of issues, it may seem odd to claim that natural law is only a part of ethics, for Aquinas. I will therefore 
now turn to the question of Aquinas’s moral theology. 
 
 
V. Moral Theology 
 
The subject of ethics, for Aquinas, is concerned with the qualities of heart and mind that lead to God. 
As a eudaimonist, Aquinas conceives ethics to be the study of ends as well as means. In a way that is 
not open to natural intellect without revelation, the whole of ethics concerns the human being’s return 
to God, who is the first beginning and the last end of all things.77 This does not mean that natural law 
itself is entirely ‘secular’: Aquinas concedes that human beings have a natural inclination to ‘know 
the truth concerning God.’78 In all things that act for the sake of an end, there must be an inclination 
toward that end. This means that there must be an inchoate presence of the end [inchoationem finis] 
in the thing acting, without which it would not act for the sake of that end.79 But in the case of the 
ultimate end, enjoyment of the vision of God is elevated entirely beyond the power of created natures. 
Consequently we human beings do not of our own capacity have a sufficient inclination to the 
ultimate end, and need God to infuse into us the virtues that lead to Him.80  These include the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, but charity (Christian love, in Latin caritas) infuses all 
of the other virtues, in order to direct them toward the correct ultimate end.81 
 
It would not be practical to give a full account here of Aquinas’s moral theology. I will instead discuss 
only a few matters which demonstrate how the subject of ethics in Aquinas goes beyond the more 
limited purposes of natural law. These examples will also serve to show the extent to which the ends 
and goods at the heart of Aquinas’s ethics are virtuous goods rather than non-moral goods. The 
examples will mostly concern the workings of charity, but I will begin with a point concerning the 
virtue of hope [spes]. 
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The virtue of hope concerns the eternal happiness of the beatific vision, and not the glory of worldly 
states.82 It represents the Christian person’s devotion to God and ‘hatred’ (i.e. disregard) of earthly 
things. Aquinas’s discussion of natural law, like Aristotle’s Ethics, makes clear that suffering and 
misfortune affect the virtuous person so that pre-moral goods such as health are necessary instruments 
in the effort to attain happiness. A person who lacks these goods cannot truly be happy.83 Aquinas is 
able to surpass Aristotle’s rather bleak conclusion, for Aristotle did not possess the theological 
concept of hope in eternal rest. Aquinas points out that the reference to happiness must be understood 
as a reference to natural happiness, in other words to the works of the virtues. For a person who 
possesses hope, suffering and misfortune do not threaten their progress toward the ultimate end. 
Rather they will interpret their suffering as an opportunity to exhibit virtuous patience and fortitude, 
and to dedicate their efforts to God’s glory. In the absence of hope, life’s sorrows are merely what 
Aristotle says they are: potentially depriving the virtuous person of happiness, or even of 
opportunities to exercise virtue.84 
 
I will now turn to the infused virtue of charity. The requirements of charity are in addition to natural 
law, for natural law is a type of ius, whereas charity is concerned with Christian moral obligations 
that extend beyond what is due to one. It consists of the love of neighbours and enemies, and the 
forgiveness of wrongs for which it would not be unjust to seek recompense (the imitation of Christ). 
Charity is not simply an additional virtue to the theory of natural law, because it infuses all of the 
virtuous goods that are the subject of natural law. It does this by directing the works of all the virtues 
to the ultimate end of friendship with God. To do so it not only transforms the end, but also the very 
basis of virtues such as justice, compassion, prudence and so on.85 This clearly shows the importance 
of charity for Aquinas’s ethics. Natural law directs us to be just in our dealings toward others: we 
should give to each person what is rightfully theirs, and refrain from that which belongs to another.86 
As we have seen, natural law also directs that the virtuous person should sometimes forego their right, 
in order to avoid public scandal or disturbance. In addition to this, natural law specifies that one 
should exercise one’s rights compassionately: sometimes one will be guilty of a lack of compassion 
[immisericordia] unless one refrains from one’s right, for example, where an insolvent debtor’s other 
creditors are in greater need. Compassion is exercised on the basis of the harm caused to another by 
the exercise of one’s rights. Christian charity goes beyond this because the love of one’s neighbours 
and enemies may sometimes necessitate relinquishing one’s rights even where there would be no 
harm in asserting them: this is clearest in the case of forgiving one’s enemies instead of prosecuting 
them.87 
 
It is plain to see how Aquinas’s ethics goes beyond the natural law in this instance. By refraining 
from one’s right, the exercise of charity results in a harm to oneself: one does not get what was justly 
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(naturally) due to one. But this does not mean that the workings of charity are unjust, because charity 
infuses the natural moral virtues, including justice. One’s charitable works are therefore 
(supernaturally) just.88 
 
The needs of Christian charity inform not only justice, but all the other virtues as well. Charity is the 
true measure of all acts of virtue, because (in Aquinas’s example) a person is not just merely by 
performing acts of justice, but by performing acts of justice with a just heart and will.89 Indeed, acts 
of other virtues do not contain merit except insofar as they are informed by charity.90 As a theological 
virtue, charity directs all works to the final end of friendship with God, but it also includes the love 
of other people because God created them and exists in them.91 Accordingly charity motivates a 
person to assist others and display benevolence towards them according to the love that is due to 
those with whom we share in Christ’s love, not the ‘natural affection’ that exists between family 
members and friends.92 A person with charity does not only withdraw from sin but exerts themselves 
to good works, i.e. to acts of virtues plus Christian beatitudes and the promptings of the Holy Spirit.93 
There are many possible examples of such good works, such as putting oneself at risk in order to save 
another’s life, doing good to an enemy, or donating to public causes. But a very obvious case is giving 
alms to the poor, an act which has become synonymous with ‘charity’ in modern times. At the same 
time, it should be remembered that Christian charity involves much more than ‘charity’ in the narrow 
sense. 
 
The requirement to love one’s neighbour from charity involves many outward acts as well as inward 
states.94 Being ‘well-disposed’ to others involves not only peaceful intentions but also concord, i.e. a 
positive willingness to assist others and join with them as a single community. It involves the 
readiness to interpret the motives and actions of others in the best light (the benefit of doubt), and a 
readiness to forgive others for their faults. But it also calls for the defence of the poor, which concerns 
the hunger and thirst for justice, and the courage to oppose injustices even when one is not personally 
affected by them. A benevolent disposition toward others also demands that one control one’s own 
inward states, by refraining from anger and restraining oneself from looking at others with lust or 
envy. 
 
Aquinas makes explicit in his treatment of law, that these requirements are in addition to lawful 
obligations for the Christian. Interpreters have invoked Aquinas’s distinction between lawful precepts 
and ‘counsels of perfection’ in order to be dismissive of counsels, as optional additional obligations 
that a person may choose to obey (supererogation).95 They have not fully understood that counsels 
                                                
88 See e.g. De Car 10 ad 9. 
89 Sent III.29.1. 
90 Ibid, III.30.5 ad 3; ST I-II.114.4; cf. ST II-II.23.7c. 
91 ST II-II.25.1c & ad 1; De Car 8 ad 14. 
92 Ibid, II-II.31.2; Sent III.29.6: sharing in Christ’s love is a form of friendship that is more noble than familial or political friendship 
(i.e. between fellow citizens); but it is admixed with these other loves in the mortal world; though NB ST II-II.31.3c. 
93 Ibid, III.29.8c; III.27.2.2c; ST I-II.108.1 (on the importance of the Holy Spirit); ST I-II.108.3 (on the beatitudes). 
94 See De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae 13.9: charity must be practical and fruitful [efficax et operosa]. 
95 See Finnis, Aquinas, 192: ‘I have a duty of strict justice (not merely ‘charity’) to relieve [the in extremis needs of others]’; and the 
accompanying footnote: ‘Misleadingly (in some respects), Aquinas’s main treatment of the duty [to the poor] is under the heading of 
‘charity’…’ Cf. De Car 8c: charity consists of both precepts and counsels of perfection: both operate in relation to loving one’s enemies, 
but only the latter demands ‘active’ love (e.g. showing generosity to an enemy when there is no duty of assistance).  
  
form part of ethics, i.e. that ethics for Aquinas goes beyond the matter of one’s lawful obligations.96 
Virtuous goods such as charity do not lie above or beyond the scope of duty, but they perfect one’s 
duty. This can be clearly seen in the Sermon on the Mount, where Christ’s statement of the beatitudes 
is linked with injunctions against retaliation and impurity of thought (uncharitable thoughts) and 
duties of mercy, beneficence, etc.97 Aquinas follows Augustine in regarding the Sermon on the Mount 
as the crowning pinnacle of Christian moral teaching.98 This confirms that for Aquinas, ethics is 
concerned centrally with virtuous goods: Christ first enumerates the beatitudes, the true forms of 
happiness for which humans should strive, and then warns against inferior or mistaken impressions 
of goodness which humans find attractive, i.e. inward states or exterior acts which destroy beatitude 
rather than fulfil them. The virtues of penitence and humility are therefore a necessary foundation of 
one’s effort to perfect the virtues.99 All of the Prima-secundae is structured after the Lord’s Prayer 
which Christ teaches as the correct order of petitions for which human beings should hope: it begins 
with the identity of the ultimate end (Thy Kingdom come), then discusses human habits and passions 
(Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven) and ends with the treatise on Grace (deliver us from 
evil). 
 
The importance of charity in Aquinas’s ethics shows us that human loves are supposed to be ordered 
to the love of God. If a person disconnects their love of earthly goods, such as knowledge, wealth or 
play, from the ultimate source of goodness (cupidity), they are really acting in hatred of God: ‘Love 
is naturally the first act of will and appetite; therefore all other movements of appetite presuppose 
love as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good 
that is loved; nor is anything an object of hate except in being opposed to the object of love.’100 The 
true goods of human life, as this shows, must be the virtuous goods that are connected with charity: 
joy and peace, mercy and beneficence, the giving of alms and correction of one’s brothers; and a 
rejection of the contrary vices of hatred and contentiousness, intolerance and envy, luxury and 
seduction. 101  Aquinas speaks of this as the order of charity [ordo caritatis]. By contrast, the 
fundamental human natural goods mentioned by Finnis and other modern Thomists do not conform 
to any order, for they are irreducibly distinct from one another: even in a life of ‘integral human 
fulfilment’, one’s enjoyment of play or aesthetic enjoyment is not an aspect of ‘religion’.102 In fact a 
careful reading of Aquinas’s treatments of the progress of charity and its decrease, reveal that progress 
in morality is only made by detaching oneself from the love of created (natural) goods.103 
 
                                                
96 See e.g. ST I-II.108.4c & ad 4; II-II.59.3 ad 1. 
97 For an account of the importance of the Sermon on the Mount for ethics, particularly in Aquinas’s ethics, see S Pinckaers (n 6), 134-
78; also T Schaffner, ‘Is Francisco Suarez a Natural Law Ethicist?’ in K Bunge et al eds. The Concept of Law (Lex) in the Moral, Legal 
and Political Thought of the School of Salamanca (Frommann-Holzboog Verlag 2015). 
98 See esp. ST I-II.107.2-108.4. 
99 Ibid, II-II.151.5c & ad 2; III.84.5 ad 2. 
100 Ibid, I.20.1c. Aquinas makes the point explicit in relation to charity at II-II.24.8c, which speaks of the love of ‘divine things, whilst 
scorning all else except as demanded by the needs of present life.’ See also II-II.24.9 on charity’s progress; II-II.24.10c & ad 2; De 
Car 8c. 
101 This roughly summarises ST II-II.28-43. See further E Schockenhoff, ‘The Theological Virtue of Charity’ in S Pope ed. The Ethics 
of Aquinas (Georgetown University Press 2002), 244-58. 
102 See Finnis, NLNR, 92: ‘none [of the goods is] merely an aspect of any of the others … [each one] can reasonably be regarded as the 
most important. Hence there is no objective hierarchy amongst them.’ Cf. 450, ‘no single, objective hierarchy’. Contrast ST II-II.26.1; 
II-II.26.5-7; II-II.27.6; Sent III.29.1.1; De Caritate IX. 
103 See esp ST II-II.24.8c; II-II.26.5c & ad 2; II-II.24.10. 
  
When it is viewed in the terms suggested here, Aquinas’s ethics accomplishes two things. First, 
through the virtues, it establishes common ground between Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s ethics — 
between Christian and non-Christian modes of life. Second, through the theological virtues, it 
explains how ethics for the Christian preserves personal freedom, because it does not require that 
everybody adopt the same way of living in respect of human natural goods, whilst describing the 
highly exacting moral standards to which all persons must conform themselves. Just because it is 
agnostic about which natural goods a person should prioritise, the proper concern of ethics is with 





It would clearly be possible to say a lot more about all of the foregoing issues. Nonetheless, the above 
survey allows us to conclude that new natural law Thomists such as Finnis seriously misrepresent 
Aquinas’s ethics. They do this first of all by marginalising the virtues in the study of natural law, and 
subsequently by identifying the whole of Aquinas’s ethics with natural law. On the contrary, I have 
argued that the natural law plays a more limited role in Aquinas’s ethics, which is properly concerned 
with the ordering of virtue toward the perfection of charity. Thus, modern Thomist philosophers 
should (i) differentiate between natural law and ethics in the full sense of moral theology, and (ii) 
interpret goodness and the good as a reference to virtuous goodness rather than non-moral goodness. 
                                                
104 On charity’s perfection see ST II-II.24.8; II-II.184.2; Sent III.27.3.4; De Caritate X-XI. 
